A reported iPhone extraction in Russia shows how commercial forensic tools can keep shaping high-risk investigations long after a vendor says it has left a market.
A reported case involving counterfeit USB drives in Japan's defense ecosystem shows how unvetted removable media can still slip into highly sensitive environments.
A reported case involving counterfeit, malware-infected USB drives shows how a single removable device can become a trust-boundary problem in sensitive military environments.
The real security problem is not whether battlefield AI is smart enough, but whether commanders, engineers, and operators can still control it when sensors lie, links fail, or decisions outrun human review.
Google-linked threat research has surfaced StockStay as a fresh malware line in Turla operations, underscoring how targeted espionage campaigns keep rebuilding their access paths rather than relying on a single implant.
The removal of several VK-related apps from the App Store shows how one distribution gate can reshape access to social, media, and mail services in a single move.
A Unit 42-tracked intrusion cluster blended open-source tooling with a custom .NET backdoor, raising the stakes for governments and energy operators that depend on exposed web applications.
A newly identified .NET implant shows how espionage tooling can borrow the look and feel of normal desktop apps while keeping remote tasking quietly alive.
A mobile device can reveal not only what was inside it, but also how it was accessed - and, in this case, two different evidence layers point toward Cellebrite UFED use.
A reported Turla-linked backdoor aimed at Ukrainian government and military targets shows how state-style intrusion kits now lean on modular design, web-like traffic, and host-specific behavior.
A reported Cellebrite-assisted extraction from a detained activist’s iPhone shows how device seizure, not remote hacking, can become the decisive moment in modern surveillance and repression cases.
A newly identified .NET backdoor and a mix of legitimate remote-access utilities show how modern intrusions can hide inside normal admin traffic.
A custom .NET backdoor tied to a Southeast Asia intrusion cluster shows how modern espionage now relies on trusted Windows paths, tunneling software, and low-noise exfiltration.
A Windows archive flaw, a little-seen filesystem feature, and a stealer family linked to Ukraine-focused targeting show how old software mistakes can keep paying off for attackers.